We address the problem of modelling and verifying contract-oriented systems, wherein distributed agents may advertise and stipulate contracts, but -differently from most other approaches to distributed agents -are not assumed to always behave "honestly". We describe an executable specification in Maude of the semantics of CO2, a calculus for contract-oriented systems [5] . The honesty property [4] characterises those agents which always respect their contracts, in all possible execution contexts. Since there is an infinite number of such contexts, honesty cannot be directly verified by model-checking the state space of an agent (indeed, honesty is an undecidable property in general [4] ). The main contribution of this paper is a sound verification technique for honesty. To do that, we safely over-approximate the honesty property by abstracting from the actual contexts a process may be engaged with. Then, we develop a model-checking technique for this abstraction, we describe an implementation in Maude, and we discuss some experiments with it.
Introduction
Contract-oriented computing is a software design paradigm where the interaction between clients and services is disciplined through contracts [5, 3] . Contract-oriented services start their life-cycle by advertising contracts which specify their required and offered behaviour. When compliant contracts are found, a session is created among the respective services, which may then start interacting to fulfil their contracts. Differently from other design paradigms (e.g. those based on the session types discipline [9] ), services are not assumed to be honest, in that they might not respect the promises made [4] . This may happen either unintentionally (because of errors in the service specification), or because of malicious behaviour.
Dishonest behaviour is assumed to be automatically detected and sanctioned by the service infrastructure. This gives rise to a new kind of attacks, that exploit possible discrepancies between the promised and the actual behaviour. If a service does not behave as promised, an attacker can induce it to a situation where the service is sanctioned, while the attacker is reckoned honest. A crucial problem is then how to avoid that a service results definitively culpable of a contract violation, despite of the honest intentions of its developer.
In this paper we present an executable specification in Maude [8] of CO 2 , a calculus for contractoriented computing [3] . Furthermore, we devise and implement a sound verification technique for honesty. We start in § 2 by introducing a new model for contracts. Borrowing from other approaches to behavioural contracts [7, 4] , ours are bilateral contracts featuring internal/external choices, and recursion. We define and implement in Maude two crucial primives on contracts, i.e. compliance and culpability testing, and we study some relevant properties.
In § 3 we present CO 2 (instantiated with the contracts above), and an executable specification of its semantics in Maude. In § 4 we formalise a weak notion of honesty, i.e. when a process P is honest in a given context, and we implement and experiment with it through the Maude model checker.
The main technical results follow in § 5, where we deal with the problem of checking honesty in all possible contexts. To do that, we start by defining an abstract semantics of CO 2 , which preserves the transitions of a participant A[P ], while abstracting those of the context wherein A[P ] is run. Building upon the abstract semantics, we then devise an abstract notion of honesty (α-honesty, Def. 5.6), which neglects the execution context. Theorem 5.7 states that α-honesty correctly approximates honesty, and that -under certain hypotheses -it is also complete. We then propose a verification technique for α-honesty, and we provide an implementation in Maude. Some experiments have then been carried out; quite notably, our tool has allowed us to determine the dishonesty of a supposedly-honest CO 2 process appeared in [4] (see Ex. 5.12).
Modelling contracts
We model contracts as processes in a simple algebra, with internal/external choice and recursion. Compliance between contracts ensures progress, until a successful state is reached. We prove that our model enjoys some relevant properties. First, in each non-final state of a contract there is exactly one participant who is culpable, i.e., expected to make the next move (Theorem 2.9). Furthermore, a participant always recovers from culpability in at most two steps (Theorem 2.10).
Syntax. We assume a finite set of participant names (ranged over by A, B, . . .) and a denumerable set of atoms (ranged over by a, b, . . .). We postulate an involution co(a), also written asā, extended to sets of atoms in the natural way. Def. 2.1 introduces the syntax of contracts. We distinguish between (unilateral ) contracts c, which model the promised behaviour of a single participant, and bilateral contracts γ, which combine the contracts advertised by two participants. 
An internal sum
� i∈I a i ; c i allows to choose one of the branches a i ; c i , to perform the action a i , and then to behave according to c i . Dually, an external sum � i∈I a i . c i allows to wait for the other participant to choose one of the branches a i . c i , then to perform the corresponding a i and behave according to c i . Separators ; and . allow for distinguishing singleton internal sums a ; c from singleton external sums a . c. Empty internal/external sums are denoted with 0. We will only consider contracts without free occurrences of recursion variables X. Example 2.2. An online store A has the following contract: buyers can iteratively add items to the shopping cart (addToCart); when at least one item has been added, the client can either cancel
A says ready a. c | B says d
Figure 1: Semantics of contracts (symmetric rules for B actions omitted) the order or pay; then, the store can accept (ok) or decline (no) the payment. Such a contract may be expressed as c A below:
Instead, a buyer contract could be expressed as:
The Maude specification of the syntax of contracts is defined as follows:
sorts Atom UniContract Participant AdvContract BiContract IGuarded EGuarded IChoice EChoice Var Id RdyContract . subsort Id < IGuarded < IChoice < UniContract < RdyContract . subsort Id < EGuarded < EChoice < UniContract < RdyContract . subsort Var < UniContract .
The sorts IGuarded and EGuarded represent singleton internal/external sums, respectively, while IChoice and EChoice are for arbitrary internal/external sums. Id represents empty sums, and it is a subsort of internal and external sums (either singleton or not). RdyContract if for contracts which may have a top-level ready , while AdvContract is a unilateral contract advertised by some participant.
The operator -models the involution on atoms, with eq --a:Atom = a:Atom. The other operators are rather standard, and they guarantee that each UniContract respects the syntactic constraints imposed by Def. 2.1.
Semantics. The evolution of bilateral contracts is modelled by µ − → →, the smallest relation closed under the rules in Fig. 1 and under ≡. The congruence ≡ is the least relation including α-conversion of recursion variables, and satisfying rec X. c ≡ c{ rec X. c /X} and � i∈∅ a i ; c i ≡ � i∈∅ a i . c i . The label µ = A says a models A performing action a. Hereafter, we shall consider contracts up-to ≡.
In rule [IntExt] , participant A selects the branch a in an internal sum, and B is then forced to commit to the corresponding branchā in his external sum. This is done by marking that branch with readyā, while discarding all the other branches; B will then perform his action in the subsequent step, by rule [Rdy] .
In Maude, the semantics of contracts is an almost literal translation of that in Fig. 1 (except that labels are moved to configurations). The one-step transition relation is defined as follows: Compliance. Two contracts are compliant if, whenever a participant A wants to choose a branch in an internal sum, then participant B always offers A the opportunity to do it. To formalise compliance, we first define a partial function rdy from bilateral contracts to sets of atoms. Intuitively, if the unilateral contracts in γ do not agree on the first step, then rdy(γ) is undefined (i.e. equal to ⊥). Otherwise, rdy(γ) contains the atoms which could be fired in the first step.
Definition 2.3 (Compliance)
. Let the partial function rdy be defined as:
Then, the compliance relation �� between unilateral contracts is the largest relation such that, whenever c �� d: 
In Maude, the compliance relation is defined as suggested by Lemma 2.6. The predicate isBottom is true for a contract γ whenever rdy(γ) = ⊥. The operator <> used below allows for the transitive closure of the transition relation. The relation c |X| d is implemented by verifying that the contract A says c | B says d satisfies the LTL formula �¬ isBottom. This is done through the Maude model checker. We can verify with Maude that CA and CB are not compliant:
The problem is that CB may choose to pay even when the cart is empty. We can easily fix the buyer contract as follows, and then obtain compliance:
red CA |X| (-addToCart ; CB) . result Bool: true Culpability We now tackle the problem of determining who is expected to make the next step for the fulfilment of a bilateral contract. We call a participant A culpable in γ if she is expected to perform some actions so to make γ progress.
When A is not culpable in γ we write A˙� γ. Theorem 2.9 below establishes that, when starting with compliant contracts, exactly one participant is culpable in a bilateral contract. The only exception is A says 0 | B says 0, which represents a successfully terminated interaction, where nobody is culpable. The following theorem states that a participant is always able to recover from culpability by performing some of her duties. This requires at most two steps.
Item (1) of Theorem 2.10 says that, in a stuck contract, no participant is culpable. Item (2) says that if A is culpable, then she can always exculpate herself in at most two steps, i.e.: one step if A has an internal choice, or a ready followed by an external choice; two steps if A has a ready followed by an internal choice.
We specify culpability in Maude as follows. The formula {l} g |= --A-->> is true whenever g has been reached by some transitions of A. The participant A is culpable in g, written A :C g, if g satisfies the LTL formula O --A-->> (where O is the "next" operator of LTL). This is verified through the Maude model checker.
commutative monoidal laws for | on processes and systems 
Modelling contracting processes
We model agents and systems through the process calculus CO 2 [2] , which we instantiate with the contracts introduced in § 2. The primitives of CO 2 allow agents to advertise contracts, to open sessions between agents with compliant contracts, to execute them by performing some actions, and to query contracts.
Syntax. Let V and N be disjoint sets of session variables (ranged over by x, y, . . .) and session names (ranged over by s, t, . . .). Let u, v, . . . range over V ∪ N , and � u, � v range over 2 V∪N .
Definition 3.1. The syntax of CO 2 is given as follows:
Systems are the parallel composition of participants A[P ], delimited systems (u)S, sessions s[γ] and latent contracts {↓ u c} A . A latent contract {↓ x c} A represents a contract c (advertised by A) which has not been stipulated yet; upon stipulation, the variable x will be instantiated to a fresh session name. We assume that, in a system of the form (� u)(
We denote with K a special participant name (playing the role of contract broker) such that, in each system (� u)(A[P ] | · · · ), A � = K. We allow for prefix-guarded finite sums of processes, and write π 1 .P 1 + π 2 .P 2 for � i∈{1,2} π i .P i , and 0 for
Recursion is allowed only for processes; we stipulate that each process identifier X has a unique defining equation X(x 1 , . . . , x j ) def = P such that fv(P ) ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x j } ⊆ V, and each occurrence of process identifiers in P is prefix-guarded. We will sometimes omit the arguments of X(� u) when they are clear from the context.
Prefixes include silent action τ , contract advertisement tell ↓ u c, action execution do u a, and contract query ask u φ (where φ is an LTL formula on γ). In each prefix π � = τ , u refers to the target session involved in the execution of π.
In Maude, we translate the syntax of CO 2 almost literally. Here we just show the sorts used; see § C for the full details.
sorts System Process Prefix SessionName SessionVariable SessionIde GuardProc Sum IdeVec ProcIde ParamList . subsort SessionName < SessionIde < IdeVec . subsort Qid < SessionVariable < SessionIde < IdeVec . subsort GuardProc < Sum < Process . subsort SessionIde < ParamList .
A: tell ↓uc
A: dos a
A: asks φ
[Ask]
where del u (π) = The sort SessionIde is a super sort of both SessionVariable and SessionName. Session variables can be of sort Qid; session names can not. Sort IdeVec models sets of SessionIde (used as syntactic sugar for delimitations), while ParamList models vectors of SessionIde (used for parameters of defining equations).
Semantics. The CO 2 semantics is formalised by the relation µ − → in Fig. 3 , where
We will consider processes and systems up-to the congruence relation ≡ in Fig. 2 . The axioms for ≡ are fairly standard -except the last one: it collects garbage terms possibly arising from variable substitutions.
Rule [Tau] just fires a τ prefix. Rule [Tell] advertises a latent contract {↓ x c} A . Rule [Fuse] finds agreements among the latent contracts: it happens when there exist {↓ x c} A and {↓ y d} B such that A � = B and c �� d. Once the agreement is reached, a fresh session containing γ = A says c | B says d is created. Rule [Do] allows a participant A to perform an action in the session s containing γ (which, accordingly, evolves to γ � ). Rule [Ask] allows A to proceed only if the contract γ at session s satisfies the property φ. The last three rules are mostly standard. In rule [Del] the label π fired in the premise becomes τ in the consequence, when π contains the delimited name/variable. This transformation is defined by the function del u (π), where the set fnv(π) contains the free names/variables in π. For
Here, it would make little sense to have the label A : tell ↓ x c, as x (being delimited) may be α-converted.
Implementing in Maude the semantics of CO 2 is almost straightforward [18] ; here we show only the main rules (see § C for the others). Rule [Do] uses the transition relation => on bilateral contracts. Rule [Ask] exploits the Maude model checker to verify if the bilateral contract g satisfies the LTL formula phi. Rule [Fuse] uses the operator |X| to check compliance between the contracts 
Honesty
A remarkable feature of CO 2 is that it allows for writing dishonest agents which do not keep their promises. Intuitively, a participant is honest if she always fulfils her contractual obligations, in all possible contexts. Below we formalise the notion of honesty, by slightly adapting the one appeared in [2] . Then, we show how we verify in Maude a weaker notion, i.e. honesty in a given context. We start by defining the set O A s (S) of obligations of A at s in S. Whenever A is culpable at some session s, she has to fire one of the actions in O 
The set of atoms RD 
where we write S A: � =dos
A participant is ready in a systemif she can fulfil some of her obligations. To check if A is ready in S, we consider all the sessions s in S involving A. For each of them, we check that some obligations of A at s are exposed after some steps of A not preceded by other do s of A. We can now formalise when a participant is honest. Roughly, A[P ] is honest in a given system S when A is ready in all evolutions of A[P ] | S. Then, A[P ] is honest when she is honest in all systemsS. Definition 4.3 (Honesty). We say that:
1. S is A-free iff it has no latent/stipulated contracts of A, nor processes of A
A is ready in S iff
. P is honest iff, for all S, P is honest in S
We have implemented items 2 and 3 of the above definition in Maude (item 4 is dealt with in the next section). CO 2 can simulate Turing machines [4] , hence reachability in CO 2 is undecidable, and consequently WRD, readiness and honesty are undecidable as well. To recover decidability, we then restrict to finite state processes: roughly, these are the processes with neither delimitations nor parallel compositions under process definitions.
In Maude we verify readiness in a session s by searching if A can reach (with her moves only), a state which allows for a do s a move, for some a. We start the search from the term < S > A s, whose meta-representation is obtained through the upTerm function. 
Example 4.4.
A travel agency A queries in parallel an airline ticket broker F and a hotel reservation service H in order to organise a trip for some user U. The agency first requires U to pay, and then chooses either to commit the reservation or to issue a refund (contract CU). When querying the ticket broker (contract CF), the agency first receives a quotation, and then chooses either to commit and pay the ticket, or to abort the transaction. The contract CH between A and H is similar. In addition to the contracts above, the agency should respect the following constraints: (a) the agency refunds U only if both the transactions with F and H are aborted; (b) A pays the ticket and the hotel reservation only after it has committed the transaction with U; (c) either both the transactions with F or H are committed, or they are both aborted. A possible specification in Maude respecting the above constraints is given by the following process P:
eq P = ( xu , xf , xh ) ( tell xu CU . do xu pay . The process P first opens a session with U, and then advertises the contracts CF and CH, and in parallel executes PU. The process PF gets the ticket quotation, then either commits the hotel reservation, or aborts the flight reservation. Dually, PH gets the hotel quotation, then either commits the flight reservation, or aborts the hotel reservation. Note that the two choices in PF and PH ensure that constraint (c) above is satisfied: e.g., if PF fires the commitH (resp. abortF) prefix, the abortH (resp. commitF) branch in PH is disabled, and only commitF (resp. abortH) can be selected. The process PU checks if a refund is due to U. When the atom payH is no longer reachable in session xh, the ask passes, and the refund is issued. This guarantees constraint (a). In the τ -branch, PU commits the transaction with U, and then proceeds to pay both F and H. This satisfies constraint (b). Note that it may happen that PU chooses to commit even when CF or CH are not stipulated. Although this behaviour is conceptually wrong, it does not affect honesty. Indeed, honesty does not consider the domain-specific constraints among actions (e.g. (a), (b), (c) above), but only that the advertised contracts are respected.
We have experimented the function honest-ctx by inserting P in some contexts S where all the other participants U, F and H are honest (see §B for details). The Maude model checker has correctly determined that P is honest in S. Even though we conjecture that P is honest (in all contexts), we anticipate here that the verification technique proposed in § 5 does not classify P as honest. This is because the analysis is (correct but) not complete in the presence of ask: indeed, the precise behaviour of an ask is lost by the analysis, because it abstracts from the contracts of the context. 
In the above computation, an unfair scheduler prevents A from making her moves, and so A remains persistently culpable in such computation. However, A is ready in S � (because the do s a is enabled), and therefore P is honest according to Def. 4.3. This is coherent with our intuition about honesty: an honest participant will always exculpate herself in all fair computations, but she might stay culpable in the unfair ones, because an unfair scheduler might always give precedence to the actions of the context.
Model checking honesty
We now address the problem of automatically verifying honesty. As mentioned in § 1, this is a desirable goal, because it alerts system designers before they deploy services which could violate contracts at run-time (so possibly incurring in sanctions). Since honesty is undecidable in general [4] , our goal is a verification technique which safely over-approximates honesty, i.e. it never classifies a process as honest when it is not. The first issue is that Def. 4.3 requires readiness to be preserved in all possible contexts, and there is an infinite number of such contexts. To overcome this problem, we present below an abstract semantics of CO 2 which preserves the honesty property, while neglecting the actual context where the process A[P ] is executed.
The definition of the abstract semantics of CO 2 is obtained in two steps. First, we provide the projections from concrete contracts/systems to the abstract ones. Then, we define the semantics of abstract contracts and systems, and we relate the abstract semantics with the concrete one. The abstraction is always parameterised in the participant A the honesty of which is under consideration.
The abstraction α A (γ) of a bilateral contract γ = A says c | B says d (Definition 5.1 below) is either c, or ctx .c when d has a ready .
Definition 5.1. For all γ, we define the abstract contract α A (γ) as:
We now define the abstraction α A of concrete systems, which just discards all the components not involving A, and projects the contracts involving A.
Definition 5.2.
For all A, S we define the abstract system α A (S) as:
Abstract semantics. We now introduce the semantics of abstract contracts and systems. For all participants A, the abstract LTSs � − → → A and µ − → A on abstract contracts and systems, respectively, are defined by the rules in Fig. 4 . Labels � are atoms, with or without the special prefix ctxwhich indicates a contractual action performed by the context. Labels µ are either ctx or they have the form A : π, where A is the participant in − → A , and π is a CO 2 prefix.
Rules for abstract contracts (first row in Fig. 4 ) are simple: in an internal sum, A chooses a branch; in an external sum, the choice is made by the context; in a ready a.c the atom a is fired. The rightmost rule handles a ready in the context contract. For abstract systems, some rules are similar to the concrete ones, hence we discuss only the most relevant ones. Rule To check if A[P ] is honest, we must only consider those A-free contexts not already containing advertised/stipulated contracts of A. Such systems will always evolve to a system which can be split in two parts: an A-solo system S A containing the process of A, the contracts advertised by A and all the sessions containing contracts of A, and an A-free system S ctx . Definition 5.3. We say that a system S is A-solo iff one of the following holds:
A: asks φ We say that S is A-safe iff S ≡ (� s)(S A | S ctx ), with S A A-solo and S ctx A-free.
The following theorems establish the relations between the concrete and the abstract semantics of CO 2 . Theorem 5.4 states that the abstraction is correct, i.e. for each concrete computation there exists a corresponding abstract computation. Theorem 5.5 states that the abstraction is also complete, provided that a process has neither ask nor non-proper contracts.
Theorem 5.4. For all A-safe systems S, and for all concrete traces η:
Furthermore, if η is A-solo and S is ask-free, then η =η.
Theorem 5.5. For all ask-free abstract systemS with proper contracts only:
The abstract counterparts of Ready Do, Weak Ready Do, and readiness are defined as expected, by using the abstract semantics instead of the concrete one (see §B for details). The notion of honesty for abstract systems, namely α-honesty, follows the lines of that of honesty in Def. 4.3.
Definition 5.6 (α-honesty). We say that P is α-honest iff for allS such that
The main result of this paper follows. It states that α-honesty is a sound approximation of honesty, and -under certain conditions -it is also complete.
Theorem 5.7. If P is α-honest, then P is honest. Conversely, if P is honest, ask-free, and has proper contracts only, then P is α-honest.
In Maude, we implement abstract semantics for system and contracts for one-step transitions. We obtain their transitive closure, discarding labels, with the operator < >. The function ready in search-honest computes abstract readiness. Honesty is checked by searching for states such that A is not ready. If the search fails, then A is honest. As in § 4, this function is decidable for finite state processes, i.e. those without delimitation/parallel under process definitions.
On the verification of ask We now formalise the meaning of the relation � used in the concrete and abstract semantics of ask . Let A be the set of atoms, and let ε � ∈ A. Let a, b, · · · range over A ∪ {ε}. In the following all γ are assumed to be compositions of compliant unilateral contracts.
Definition 5.8. We define the (unlabelled) transition system TS = (Σ, →, I, A, L) as follows:
• S = {(a, γ) | γ is a bilateral contract and a ∈ A ∪ {ε}},
• the transition relation →⊆ S × S is defined by the following rule:
Definition 5.9. We define the (unlabelled) transition system � TS = (Σ, → , I, A, L) as follows:
• S = {(a,c) |c is an abstract contract and a ∈ A ∪ {ε}},
Definition 5.10. We define the set Paths(s 0 ) of maximal traces from a state s 0 as:
Then, we write:
• γ � φ whenever ∀π ∈ Paths((�, γ)). π |= φ in LTL.
•c � φ whenever ∀π ∈ Paths((�,c)). π |= φ in LTL.
Lemma 5.11 below guarantees the correctness of the abstract semantics of ask. Item (1) shows the correctness of rule [α-ask]: ifc � φ, then the rule allows for a transition of A, and then by Lemma 5.11 we know that ask φ will pass in each possible concrete context. Rule [α-askCtx] allows the context to fire the ask φ only ifc � � ¬φ. Item (2) of Lemma 5.11 shows that this condition is correct, because whenever the ask φ may pass in some concrete context, thenc � � ¬φ holds.
Lemma 5.11. For all abstract contractsc and for all LTL formulae φ:
Experiments
The following example shows a process which was erroneously classified as honest in [4] . The Maude model checker has determined the dishonesty of that process, and by exploiting the Maude tracing facilities we managed to fix it. We can specify in Maude a CO 2 process for A as follows: Variables x and y in P correspond to two separate sessions, where A respectively interacts with B and V. The advertisement of CV causally depends on the stipulation of the contract CB, because A must fire clickVoucher before tell y CV. In process Q the store waits for the answer of V: if V validates the voucher (first branch), then A accepts it from B; otherwise (second branch), A requires B to pay. The third branch R allows A to fire a τ action, and then reject the voucher. The intuition is that τ models a timeout, to deal with the fact that CV might not be stipulated. When we check the honesty of P with Maude, we obtain: eq PA = (x) (tell x CA . do x addToCart . X(x)) . eq PPay = do x pay . (t . do x -ok . 0 + t . do x -no . 0) . eq env = (X(x) =def do x addToCart . X(x) + PPay + do x cancel . 0) .
The process PA first advertises the contract CA, and when the session x is created, it waits that the user performs the first addToCart. Then, the store enters a recursive process X. In the body of X, the store accepts three actions from the user: an addToCart, which is followed by a recursive call to X, a cancel, which terminates the store process, or a pay from the user, which is handled by the process PPay. Within PPay, after the payment is received the store internally chooses whether to accept it or not, by firing the actions -ok or -no, respectively. The Maude model checker correctly classifies the process PA as honest: Example 5.14. Consider an on-line food store A, which sells apples (a) and bottles of an expensive italian Brunello wine (b). Selling apples is quite easy: once an order is placed, A accepts it (with the feedback -ok) and waits for a payment (pay) before shipping the goods (-ship-a). However, if expensive bottles of Brunello are ordered, the store is entitled to either decline the order (by answering -no), or accept it (and, as above, ship the item after the payment). The store contract can be modelled in Maude as follows:
eq CA = a . -ok ; pay . and a possible specification of the store A is:
eq ship-a? = <> (-ship-a) . eq PA = (x) (tell x CA . do x a . X(x) + do x b . X(x)) . eq env = (X(x) =def do x -ok . do x pay . ask x ship-a? . do x -ship-a . 0) .
Here, A creates a private channel x, and advertises the contract CA. Once the session at x is initiated, PA can accept an order for a or b on x. In both cases, the process X(x) is invoked. There, A accepts the transaction with ok, and waits for payment. Then A checks whether the contract requires to ship apples: if the query ask x ship-a? passes, the goods are shipped. Otherwise, when the customer B orders Brunello, A maliciously gets stuck, and so B has paid for nothing. Clearly, this store is dishonest, as it does not respect its own contract CA. The Maude model checker gives: Consider now a non-malicious implementation of the store. Here, before accepting orders the store requires an insurance to cover shipment damages. -which may be particularly useful for the expensive (and fragile) Brunello bottles. The contract between A and the insurance company is:
eq CI = -payI . (-cover ; 0 (+) -cancel ; 0) .
There, A promises to pay (payI) and then choose between getting the coverage, or cancelling the request. The new specification of the store process is: eq PA = (x , y) (tell y CI . do y -payI . tell x CA .
(do x a . do x -ok . X(x) + do x b . Y(x ; y))) . The store A first requests an insurance by advertising CI. Once an insurance company C agrees, A pays the premium (on channel y), and then advertises CA; once an agreement with a customer B is reached, A waits for a or b orders. If apples are requested, A acknowledges (-ok) and invokes X(x); there, A waits for payment, checks which good has to be shipped, and actually ships it. Otherwise, if Brunello is requested, Y(x,y) is invoked: there, A requests the insurance coverage paid in advance; then, either the order is accepted and X(x) is invoked for payment and shipment (as above), or the transaction is declined after an internal τ -action (e.g. a wake up after a timeout).
When we check PA for honesty, we obtain: The specification of PA does not seem malicious: however, it is keen to ship the goods, but it is not honest either due to the interaction between A and the insurance company. Actually, if C does not execute cover, then A gets stuck on do y -cover, unable to honour CA by providing the expected ok or no. Furthermore, A is dishonest w.r.t. CI: the premium is paid in advance, but A may never perform do y -cover nor do y -cancel -e.g. if no agreement on CA is found, or if the customer B is stuck, or if B simply chooses to buy apples. Thus, due to implementation naïveties, A may be blamed due to the unexpected (or malicious) behaviour of other participants. 
Conclusions
We have described an executable specification in Maude of a calculus for contract-oriented systems. This has been done in two steps. First, we have specified a model for contracts, and we have formalised in Maude their semantics, and the crucial notions of compliance and culpability ( § 2). This specification has been exploited in § 3 to implement in Maude the calculus CO 2 [3] . Then, we have considered the problem of honesty [4] , i.e. that of deciding when a participant always respects the contracts she advertises, in all possible contexts ( § 4). Writing honest processes is not a trivial task, especially when multiple sessions are needed for realising a contract (see e.g. Ex. 4.4 and Ex. 5.12). We have then devised a sound verification technique for deciding when a participant is honest, and we have provided an implementation of this technique in Maude ( § 5).
Related work. Rewriting logic [11] has been successfully used for more than two decades as a semantic framework wherein many different programming models and logics are naturally formalised, executed and analysed. Just by restricting to models for concurrency, there exist Maude specifications and tools for CCS [16] , the π-calculus [15] , Petri nets [14] , Erlang [13] , Klaim [17] , adaptive systems [6] , etc. A more comprehensive list of calculi, programming languages, tools and applications implemented in Maude is collected in [12] .
The contract model presented in § 2 is a refined version of the one in [4] , which in turn is an alternative formalisation of the one in [7] . Our version is simpler and closer to the notion of session behaviour [1] , and enjoys several desirable properties. Theorem 2.9 establishes that only one participant may be culpable in a bilateral contract, whereas in [4] both participants may be culpable, e.g. in A says a ; c | B saysā ; d. In our model, if both participants have an internal (or external) choice, then their contracts are not compliant, whereas e.g. a.c andā.d (both external choices) are compliant in [4, 7] whenever c and d are compliant. The exculpation property established by Theorem 2.10 is stronger than the corresponding one in [4] . There, a participant A is guaranteed to exculpate herself by performing (at most) two consecutive actions of A, while in our model two any actions (of whatever participant) suffice.
As far as we know, the concept of contract-oriented computing (in the meaning used in this paper) has been introduced in [5] . CO 2 , a contract-agnostic calculus for contract-oriented computing, has been instantiated with several contract models -both bilateral [4, 2] and multiparty [10, 3] . Here we have instantiated it with the contracts in § 2. A minor difference w.r.t. [4, 2, 10] is that here we no longer have fuse as a language primitive, but rather the creation of fresh sessions is performed non-deterministically by the context (rule [Fuse] ). This is equivalent to assume a contract broker which collects all contracts, and may establish sessions when compliant contracts are found. In [4] , a participant A is considered honest when, in each possible context, she can always exculpate herself by a sequence of A-solo moves. Here we require that A is ready (i.e. some of her obligations are in the Weak Ready Do set) in all possible contexts, as in [2] . We conjecture that these two notions are equivalent. In [2] a type system has been proposed to safely over-approximate honesty. The type of a process P is a function which maps each variable to a channel type. These are behavioural types (in the form of Basic Parallel Processes) which essentially preserve the structure of P , by abstracting the actual prefixes as "non-blocking" and "possibly blocking". The type system relies upon checking honesty for channel types, but no actual algorithm is given for such verification, hence type inference remains an open issue. In contrast, here we have directly implemented in Maude a verification algorithm for honesty, by model checking the abstract semantics in § 5.
